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Property Rights After
Palazzolo:
When What You
Know Can Hurt You
By David L. Callies
I n Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S.
Ct. 2448 (2001), the U.S. Supreme
-Court addressed the effect that
"notice" of an existing land-use regu-
lation has on the two principal class-
es of regulatory takings: partial and
total. The Court held that acquisition
of title after the effective date of a
regulation does not automatically bar
either one. The Court also lowered
the ripeness barrier to bringing regu-
latory takings claims and clarified
the meaning of "economically viable
use." Equally important are the
issues that the Court foreshadowed
but left undecided: the denominator,
or relevant parcel, issue; the meaning
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of investment-backed expectations in
partial takings cases; and the applica-
tion of its notice rule in such partial
takings situations.
Palazzolo's significance is particu-
larly clear when read against the
background of the law of takings up
until now. It is divided into two prin-
cipal parts: physical and regulatory.
The first-eminent domain, compul-
sory purchase, or condemnation-
occurs when government physically
takes an interest in land. There is no
"notice" rule here (what a landowner
knew or should have known has
nothing to do with his entitlement to
compensation under the Fifth
Amendment). This is important
because in the second category, regu-
latory takings, the U.S. Supreme
Court compares total, or per se, tak-
ings to physical takings. In all regula-
tory takings, if a land-use regulation
goes "too far" in reducing the use or
value of a parcel of land, it is a taking
in accordance with the rule of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922). In Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), the Court set out its per se or
categorical rule for total regulatory
takings: if a regulation leaves an
owner without economically benefi-
cial use of the land, then the owner is
entitled to compensation as if the
property were physically taken, with
two exceptions. If the offending (in a
constitutional sense) regulation either
seeks to eliminate a nuisance or
reflects a background principle of a
state's law of property, then the regu-
lation is valid regardless of its effect
on the landowner's parcel, because
the landowner did not have these
rights (to perpetrate a nuisance or act
contrary to such background princi-
ples) as part of his bundle of property
rights in the first place. The Palazzolo
decision deals with the background
principles exception as well.
Far more common is the partial
regulatory taking, in which the
owner retains some beneficial use of
the land. Here, the Court in Lucas
(and ultimately in Palazzolo) refers
for guidance back to its 1978 decision
in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). There,
according to the Court, it is necessary
to engage in a multi-factor inquiry
into the nature of the governmental
action and the economic effect of the
regulation on the landowner, particu-
larly the extent to which the regula-
tion interferes with the distinct,
investment-backed expectations of
the landowner. As discussed below,
the Court in Palazzolo leaves partial
takings for another day.
Palazzolo's Claim
In 1959, Anthony Palazzolo and some
associates formed Shore Gardens, Inc.,
to purchase and hold three undevel-
oped parcels on Winnapaug Pond in
Westerly, Rhode Island. Much of the
land was salt marsh, requiring consid-
erable fill to stabilize the land for
development. Beginning in 1962,
Shore Gardens submitted several pro-
posals to the Rhode Island Division of
Harbors and Rivers, all of which the
Division rejected. As a result, the par-
cel sat idle for more than a decade
after its purchase.
In 1971, Rhode Island designated
all salt marshes as "coastal wet-
lands," significantly limiting the
scope of permissible development.
Any filling of or building on
Winnapaug Pond or adjacent lands
required a "special exemption" from
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the Council, a state agency charged
with the duty of protecting the
state's coastal property. To qualify for
an exemption, the statute provides
that "the proposed activity must
serve 'a compelling public purpose
which provides benefits to the public
as a whole as opposed to individual
or private interests.' " Palazzolo, 121
S. Ct. at 2456.
In 1978, Shore Gardens's corporate
charter was revoked for failure to pay
income taxes, and title to the property
passed to Palazzolo alone as the sole
shareholder. Palazzolo then resumed
development efforts and filed an
application in 1983 to dredge and fill
18 acres. When the Council denied
that application as being too substan-
tial, Palazzolo submitted a new-and
significantly smaller-development
proposal two years later. The Council
rejected the second application as
well, concluding that the proposed
development could not proceed
under any circumstances because it
did not serve a "compelling public
purpose" and, therefore, was incon-
sistent with the regulatory standard
for a special exemption.
Finding no relief in his appeal of
the administrative decision,
Palazzolo filed a takings claim, alleg-
ing that the regulation had deprived
him of all economically viable use of
his property. This allegation brought
his claim within one of the two dis-
crete categories of regulatory actions
that Lucas recognized as compensa-
ble takings without a case-specific
inquiry: (1) regulations that compel
the property owner to suffer a physi-
cal "invasion" of the property and
(2) regulations that deny all economi-
cally beneficial or productive use of
the land. 505 U.S. at 1015.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court
rejected Palazzolo's claim on three
grounds: (1) that the takings claim
was not ripe; (2) that Palazzolo was
precluded from challenging any reg-
ulations that existed before he
acquired title to the property; and
(3) that Lucas was inapplicable
because the parcel retained economi-
cally viable use despite the restric-
tion. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed that Palazzolo's claim
failed to meet the test for a per se
taking under Lucas, but the Court
held that the claim could still be con-
sidered under the multi-factored
Penn Central analysis. In so holding,
the Court concluded that Palazzolo's
claim was ripe and that he was not
barred from challenging the regula-
tion even though it pre-dated his
acquisition of the property.
Accordingly, the case was remanded
for the state courts to make the Penn
Central determination.
Ripeness
In ruling on the ripeness question, the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the state
court's application of the standards
enunciated by the Court in Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985),
and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
Under the Williamson County test, a
regulatory takings claim is not ripe
until "the government entity charged
with implementing the regulations
has reached a final decision regarding
the application of the regulations to
the property at issue." 473 U.S. at 186
(emphasis added). The MacDonald
case held that a takings claim was
unripe when the claimants had sub-
mitted only a single grandiose plan
for development and had not demon-
strated that less ambitious plans also
would be rejected. 477 U.S. at 351.
Applying these standards, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that
Palazzolo's claim was premature
because he had not demonstrated that
a more modest proposal also would
have been rejected.
The U.S. Supreme Court found the
MacDonald standard inapplicable in
Palazzolo's case. The Court noted
that cases like MacDonald "arose
when an owner challenged a land-
use authority's denial of a substantial
project, leaving doubt whether a
more modest submission or an appli-
cation for a variance would be
accepted." 121 S. Ct. at 2459.
Conversely, the Court stated that a
takings claim is likely to have
ripened "once it becomes clear that
the agency lacks the discretion to
permit any development, or the per-
missible uses of the property are
known to a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty... ." Id.
Applying this test, the Court
found that the Council had in fact
made a final decision regarding the
development of Palazzolo's property.
The Court based this decision on the
"unequivocal nature of the wetland
regulations at issue and.., the
Council's application of the regula-
tions to the subject property." Id. at
2458. The regulation provides that no
development would ever be permit-
ted on or near Winnapaug Pond-or
any other "Type 2 water"-without a
special exemption from the council,
and the council refused to grant such
an exemption unless a "compelling
public purpose" would be served.
Given the council's clear ruling that
neither of the proposed develop-
ments qualified for the exemption,
the Court easily concluded that
Palazzolo's claim was ripe for
and the denial reasonably final. In
making ripeness determinations, the
Court said, it is important to bear in
mind the basic purpose of the final
decision requirement:
Our ripeness jurisprudence impos-
es obligations on landowners
because "[a] court cannot deter-
mine whether a regulation goes
'too far' unless it knows how far
the regulation goes." Ripeness
doctrine does not require a
landowner to submit applications
for their own sake. [A claimant] is
required to explore development
opportunities on his upland parcel
only if there is uncertainty as to
the land's permitted use.
Id. at 2460.
Pre-acquisition Regulations
The most significant aspect of the
Palazzolo decision was the Court's
analysis of the effect of regulations
that pre-date the claimant's acquisi-
tion of the property Before Palazzolo, a
number of lower courts had barred
*e~g~s g .3 , ~ ,8 L
review. The Court further concluded
that the evidence established that the
council had interpreted its regula-
tions as prohibiting fill for any pur-
pose. Without fill, no development
could proceed and, consequently,
further applications would have
been pointless.
The Court's interpretation in
Palazzolo restores a reasoned
approach to ripeness issues, assuring
fair access to federal courts for tak-
ings challenges when the proposed
development is reasonably complete
regulatory takings claims when the
property owner had notice that the
property was subject to the regulation.
In Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355,
1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999), for example, the
court said that "[o]ne who buys with
knowledge of a restraint assumes the
risk of economic loss." See also Gazza
v. New York State Dep't, 679 N.E.2d
1035, 1037-41 (N.Y 1997) (no taking
occurred because Gazza purchased
the property with the knowledge that
he would need a variance, and thus he
had no right to build anything and no
PROBATE & PROPERTY in MARCH/APRIL 2002 39
cognizable property interest); Grant v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 461
S.E.2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995) (no taking
because a permit to fill tidelands was
required when claimant acquired the
property).
Following the reasoning of these
courts, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the post-regulation
acquisition of title was fatal to
Palazzolo's takings claim, whether
law simply because the regulation
pre-dated the claimant's acquisition
of title. "A regulation or common-
law rule cannot be a background
principle for some owners but not for
others[,]" the Court stated. Id. This is
the most important holding in the
case. Many commentators and sever-
al courts had engrafted such a
"notice" rule on regulatory takings
jurisprudence, particularly per se
0 0 6 ~s *s~
total (categorical or per se under
Lucas) or partial (under Penn Central).
The state court reasoned that a pur-
chaser is deemed to have had notice
of a regulation that was in effect at the
time of acquisition. The regulation,
therefore, had become a background
principle of state law, which constitut-
ed an exception to the takings claim
under Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1028-32.
Lucas provided an exception for
regulations that merely duplicate
land-use prohibitions that already
exist under background principles of
state law of property. As the Court in
Palazzolo observed, "a landowner's
ability to recover for a government
deprivation of all economically bene-
ficial use of property is not absolute
but instead is confined by limitations
on the use of land which 'inhere in
the title itself.' " Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct.
at 2464 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1029). The Court rejected the applica-
tion of this exception in Palazzolo's
case, however, stating that a regula-
tion does not become a background
principle of law merely by its enact-
ment. Id. Similarly, a regulation that
is otherwise unconstitutional absent
compensation is not transformed into
a background principle of the state's
takings under the Lucas rule. There
is, of course, no such language in
Lucas, nor could there be, given the
direct analogy of the rule there to the
law of eminent domain.
This addendum to the "notice"
rule issue emphasizes, but does not
resolve, the importance of the cate-
gorical exceptions in Lucas. The Court
signals in Palazzolo that wetlands pro-
tection is not a nuisance but leaves
untouched the increasing use of the
public trust doctrine and customary
law as potential "background princi-
ples," as found in some state court
decisions. See, e.g., In re Water Use
Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 494
(Haw. 2000) (asserting that the state
holds water rights in public trust and,
therefore, denial of water permit was
not a taking); Stevens v. City of Cannon
Beach, 854 P.2d 449, 456-57 (Or. 1993)
(holding that "the doctrine of custom
as applied to public use of Oregon's
dry sand areas" is a background prin-
ciple of the state property law). The
Court's decision in Palazzolo also
leaves the door open to some-but
not all-legislative enactments, such
as those codifying existing public
trust rights previously recognized as
limitations on private land titles.
Although Palazzolo's claim was
not categorically barred by the exis-
tence of the regulation pre-dating his
acquisition of the land, there was dis-
sension on the Court as to whether
that knowledge was a relevant fact to
be at least considered under the Penn
Central partial taking analysis. In a
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
stated that "[t]oday's holding does
not mean that the timing of the regu-
lation's enactment relative to the
acquisition of title is immaterial to
the Penn Central analysis. Indeed, it
would be just as much error to
expunge this consideration from the
takings inquiry as it would be to
accord it exclusive significance." 121
S. Ct. at 2465. Justice O'Connor rea-
soned that a landowner's knowledge
of a regulation has a bearing on the
landowner's "investment-backed
expectations" under the Penn Central
inquiry. "[Tihe regulatory regime in
place at the time the claimant
acquires the property helps to shape
the reasonableness of those expecta-
tions." Id. at 2466. Justice Breyer
agreed, adding: "Ordinarily, such
expectations will diminish in force
and significance-rapidly and dra-
matically-as property continues to
change hands over time." Id. at 2477.
Justice Scalia, in contrast, reasoned
that the existence of a regulation
before the landowner's acquisition of
title had no bearing, except as a
background principle of property
law or nuisance. In his view, "[tihe
'investment-backed expectations'
that the law will take into account do
not include the assumed validity of a
restriction that in fact deprives prop-
erty of so much of its value as to be
unconstitutional." Id. at 2468.
The upshot of this debate is that
the state courts, on remand, must
make an educated guess as to
whether Justice O'Connor's or Justice
Scalia's viewpoint will prevail with
respect to partial takings. Although
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion
suggests that he might side with
Justice O'Connor, the views of the
remaining five Justices are unclear.
Accordingly, litigants must tread with
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caution in this area until a more
definitive ruling emerges.
The Denominator Issue
Turning to the merits of Palazzolo's
claim, the Supreme Court concluded,
as did the state court, that Palazzolo
could not establish a Lucas taking
because he had not been deprived of
all economically beneficial use of his
property. The Court noted that
Palazzolo had conceded that his par-
cel retained at least $200,000 in
development value because it could
be used for construction of a resi-
dence on the upland part of the
property. The Court observed that
"[a] regulation permitting a
landowner to build a substantial resi-
dence on an 18-acre parcel does not
leave the property 'economically
idle.' "Id. at 2465.
Palazzolo also argued that the
upland parcel was distinct from the
wetlands and, therefore, it should not
be considered when determining
whether the property retains econom-
ically viable use. Common to both
total and partial takings analyses, this
raised the redoubtable "denominator
issue": what is the extent of the
landowner's property interest to be
considered in deciding whether the
interest allegedly damaged is partial-
ly taken-is it just the part of the
property affected by the regulation or
is it the entire parcel owned by the
claimant? If Palazzolo were correct,
he could have avoided the Court's
conclusion that there was no total per
se taking of his property as a whole
because part of it-the upland por-
tion-could be used to construct a
$200,000 residence. Thus, the proper-
ty as a whole would not be devoid of
economically beneficial use.
In Penn Central, the Court held
that the denominator included the
entire value of the company's hold-
ings in the area. 438 U.S. at 130-31.
Lucas, however, expressed discomfort
with this rule, referring to it as "an
extreme-and, we think, unsupport-
able-view of the relevant
calculus ...." 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
Legal commentators have since
echoed this comment. See Palazzolo,
121 S. Ct. at 2465.
The Court declined to decide the
denominator question in Palazzolo
because the issue had not been raised
in the state courts. The tenor of the
Court's opinion suggests, however, a
willingness to revisit Penn Central's
"entire parcel" theory when that
issue is properly before the Court.
Meanwhile, the law with respect to
this issue is therefore still best stated
by the Federal Circuit, which dis-
cussed the denominator issue in the
context of denials of dredge and fill
permits by the Army Corps of
Engineers under the Clean Water
Act. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1994). Out of 250 acres owned by the
claimant, the court was willing to
consider only the devaluation of 12.5
acres for which the Corps had denied
a permit. Id. at 1180-82. With the dif-
ference being $2.7 million before the
permit denial and $12,500 thereafter,
the trial court awarded the $2.7 mil-
lion, which the Federal Circuit
affirmed. Id. at 1173-75, 1182-83; see
also Palm Beach Isles v. United States,
208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that the relevant parcel for tak-
ings analysis purposes was 50.7 acres
rather than 311 acres, then later sepa-
rating out a 1.4 acre parcel in a sub-
sequent decision).
A Partial Taking
Although Palazzolo was unsuccess-
ful in his total taking claim under
Lucas, the Court concluded that
Palazzolo still had a potentially
viable claim under Penn Central. The
Court was unable to reach the merits
of that claim, however, because the
state courts had rejected both the
Lucas claim and the Penn Central
claim on the notice issue and, there-
fore, had not engaged in the requisite
factual inquiry to determine whether
a partial takings had occurred.
Having reversed the state court on
the notice issue, the U.S. Supreme
Court remanded the case for further
proceedings, consistent with its opin-
ion, to address the partial taking
issue. On remand, the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island must balance
these Penn Central factors to deter-
mine whether denying all construc-
tion-except for a single family
home on an 18-acre parcel-is indeed
a partial taking of property without
compensation.
Conclusion
Palazzolo gives property owners and
their attorneys a sharper image of
the U.S. Supreme Court's regulatory
takings jurisprudence. The Court's
ripeness ruling relieves claimants
from the burden of submitting
repeated applications for scaled-back
development plans when it is clear
that the regulatory agency would not
approve such plans. The Court also
held that claimants are not categori-
cally barred from bringing an action
when the disputed regulation pre-
dates the claimant's acquisition of
the property. The decision also casts
considerable doubt on the broad
application of a statutory exception
to per se takings under Lucas as
background principles of a state's
law of property. Left unresolved,
however, is the precise role of custom
and public trust as such background
principles. Also, whether the
landowner's knowledge of the regula-
tion has an impact on the landowner's
"investment-backed expectations,"
and, therefore, should be considered
as at least one element of a partial tak-
ings inquiry. How the Court resolves
these questions will have considerable
effect on the manner in which takings
jurisprudence is applied to regulatory
disputes between government and
landowner. U
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Technology-Probate provides information on current
technology and microcomputer software of interest in the
probate and estate planning areas. The editors of Probate
& Property welcome information and suggestions from
readers.
Linux for Lawyers
Although most columns are devoted to software written
for the Microsoft Windows operating system, there are
alternatives, such as the Apple Macintosh and Linux.
Unfortunately for Apple devotees, this column will not be
about the Macintosh, but about the newer kid on the
block, Linux.
What Is Linux?
Linux (pronounced "lih-nuhcks," not "lye-necks") is a
somewhat stripped-down version of Unix, one of the old-
est and most popular multi-tasking, multi-user operating
systems. The Linux kernel (the central component of the
operating system) was developed by a Finnish graduate
student, Linus Torvalds, in 1991. The Free Software
Foundation and Project GNU ("GNU" is a recursive
acronym meaning "GNU is Not Unix") had been working
to develop the other components needed for a complete
operating system, and they added the Linux kernel in
1992 to release what is now known as GNU/Linux or just
plain Linux.
One of the things that makes Linux unique is the licens-
ing agreement under which it is distributed. Under the
terms of the GNU General Public License developed by
the Free Software Foundation, Linux and its source code
(the instructions that were compiled to create the operating
system) are distributed for free and can be modified and
redistributed, subject to two very important restrictions.
These restrictions are that any redistributed software must
include the source code and must be subject to the same
licensing agreement. For example, I can buy a distribution
of Linu , add my own modifications, and legally resell the
resulting product, including the components originally
purchased from someone else. Linux has been described as
the first operating system written as a chain letter, with
each programmer adding two or three lines of code before
passing it along to five friends.
Technology-Probate Editor: Daniel B. Evans, P.O. Box
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Linux is therefore available for free and can be down-
loaded from a number of different web sites. Many Linux
applications are also free (or very inexpensive). In fact,
many of the applications described in this column can be
downloaded for free or purchased on a CD for less than $50.
Distributions and Desktops
Linux comes in different flavors, referred to as "distribu-
tions," each of which will include a number of utilities not
included in the original Linux operating system, such as
utilities for installing the system and software applica-
tions. The most popular distributions include Red Hat
Linux from Red Hat Software (www.redhat.com), Caldera
OpenLinux from Caldera Systems, Inc.
(www.caldera.com), SuSE Linux from SuSE Inc.
(www.suse.com), Debian/GNU sponsored by a nonprofit
organization, Software in the Public Interest, Inc.
(www.debian.org), and Corel Linux (which is based on
the Debian distribution), previously available from Corel
(www.corel.com) but recently transferred to Xandros
Corporation (www.xandros.net).
There are also a number of different desktop environ-
ments available for Linux, all of which are based on the
"X Windows" graphical user interface. These X Windows
desktops can appear to be very similar to Microsoft
Windows, with pull-down menus and icons, and the most
popular desktops are based on GNOME ("GNU Network
Object Model Environment"), KDE ("K Desktop
Environment"), and Motif. To further confuse matters, dif-
ferent Linux distributions may come with different desk-
top environments. So, for example, Red Hat Linux comes
with both GNOME and KDE (with GNOME as the
default), but Corel Linux comes with only KDE (although
GNOME can be added by the user).
These choices may lead to confusion and concern about
software compatibility, but for most users and most appli-
cations the decisions are not that critical. Most Linux
applications will run under each of the different distribu-
tions and desktops, although some modifications may be
needed in some cases.
Red Hat Linux is the most popular distribution and has
become something of an industry standard, but lawyers and
law firms wanting to try Linux might prefer the Corel distri-
bution, which is easy to install and is designed for desktop
applications (and not server applications) and provides sup-
port for WordPerfect and other Corel applications.
PROBATE & PROPERTY 0 MARCH/APRIL 2002 43
z, 2,
Basic Office Software
For basic office tasks (word processing, spreadsheets,
databases, e-mail, etc.), there is a surprising variety of
choices.
Corel WordPerfect Office 2000 is still available for
Linux and includes not only WordPerfect 2000 but also
Quattro Pro, Corel Presentations, the Paradox database,
and CorelCentral for managing information such as tasks,
calendars, and contact information.
Although Microsoft Word is not available for Linux,
there is a something of a work-alike in the form of
StarOffice from Sun Microsystems (www.sun.com),
which provides word processing (reported to have 80% of
the functionality of MS Word), spreadsheets, presentation
applications, graphics, calendar, Internet browser, e-mail,
and scheduler. StarOffice is also available for Microsoft
Windows and other operating systems.
A relatively new release is Ximian Evolution from
Ximian Inc. (www.ximian.com), which functions like
Microsoft Outlook and provides integrated e-mail, task
and contact lists, scheduling, and calendars. Ximian is
also promoting a software link to allow its Evolution
application to share information with Microsoft Exchange
servers. The Ximian desktop can also provide word pro-
cessing, spreadsheets, and graphics-editing applications.
Estate Software
For estate-specific software, the choices are much more
restricted. There are only two estate administration soft-
ware applications that might run under Linux, although
the vendors admit that they do not yet know of any users
actually running Linux with their applications. Because
these applications are not written from Linux source code,
they are not subject to the GNU general public license
described above, and the costs will be the same as for MS
Windows applications.
6-in-1 from the Lackner Group, Inc. (www.
lacknergroup.com) can provide fiduciary accountings,
federal estate tax returns (Form 706), and fiduciary
income tax returns (Form 1041), as well as many other
state tax returns and state filings. Lackner's 6-in-1 should
be able to run under Linux because the applications are
written using Filemaker Pro, and Filemaker Inc.
(www.filemaker.com) supports Red Hat Linux, as well as
the Mac OS and other operating systems.
In a similar fashion, the FASTER system from FASTER
Systems LLC ((508)347-0195) should be able to provide
fiduciary accountings, federal estate tax returns, fiduciary
income tax returns, and other returns and filings under
Linux, because the FASTER system is written in Progress.
Progress Software (www.progress.com) supports Linux,
as well as other operating systems.
For other essential programs, such as estate tax plan-
ning or other estate applications, that are available only as
MS Windows software, it may be possible to run the
applications under Linux using an emulator such as Wine
(www.winehq.com) that supports many (but not all, or
even most) Win32 software. The developers of Wine, how-
ever, admit that it is developmental software that is not
suitable for general use.
Conclusion
Working with MS Windows is not always easy, is some-
times maddeningly difficult, and is usually mysterious.
Working with Linux should be less mysterious and less
maddening but, except for the simplest installations, will
require a higher order of knowledge about the operating
system and how to install and maintain applications. If
you think of owning a computer like owning a house,
then MS Windows usually requires no more than some
simple repairs with pliers and a screwdriver. Linux, on
the other hand, often requires the ability to install new
plumbing or wiring.
Linux is therefore not for the technologically timid or
the faint of heart, but can provide a stable, efficient, and
inexpensive computing environment for those willing to
work on the "bleeding edge" of technology.
Want to look up past columns? An index of past
columns, and the software covered by those columns, is
now available through the Technology and Economics
(K-2) Committee, at www.abanet.org/rppt/cwp.html. E
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